Dr. Castaneda’s petition was based on the recommendations of Dr. Roman and Dr. Steven Ciric, another attending psychiatrist, who had examined the plaintiff on July 17, 2005. (Am.Compl., ¶¶ 59-60). In support of Dr. Castaneda’s petition, Dr. Ciric mentioned the plaintiff’s “increasingly bizarre and erratic behavior in connection with the CBS studio,” and Mr. Roman cited plaintiff’s “disguising herself to gain admission to the Letterman studio” as an example of her delusional thinking and a reason for medicating her. (Am.Compl., ¶¶ 60-61). Dr. Roman also reported that the plaintiff had “recently become increasingly belligerent and aggressive with the [s]tudio [s]ecurity, causing them to wish to have her arrested.” (Am.Compl., ¶ 61). First, plaintiff alleges that Williams violated plaintiff’s rights by telling other patients that they could smoke in the hospital, thus causing harm to plaintiff.

As to the alleged “custom” of Hospital staff to permit other patients to assault plaintiff, the Court finds that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the alleged assaults were caused by an unofficial practice of the Hospital “so persistent or widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Green, 465 F.3d at 80. Rule 104 also provides that prior to filing any motion to withdraw, the lawyer must advise his client in writing of his intention to do so. The client then has 30 days in which to notify remote interview meaning the Supreme Court if he still wishes to proceed with the appeal. If the client does not communicate with the Supreme Court, the motion will be granted and the appeal dismissed. If the client does express a desire to proceed, the Supreme Court will review the legal points raised. If the court finds them not to be frivolous, “it may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw but will prior to submission of the appeal afford the indigent the assistance of new counsel, to be appointed by the trial court.” Iowa Rule App.Proc.

Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context

Although Ms. Fish behaved cooperatively, Bellevue staff members, with no explanation, placed her in a locked ward. We agree with Judge McGowan’s observations. The funds to satisfy the award in this case must inevitably come from the general revenues of the State of Illinois, and thus the award resembles far more closely the monetary award against the State itself, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra, than it does the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Ex parte Young. The claims against Donnelly, Morgenthau and Kindler are dismissed.

As the complaint in the instant case alleges violations by officials of Illinois of the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it seems that the case is governed by Ex parte Young so far as injunctive relief is concerned. The main thrust of the argument is that the instant case asks for relief which if granted would affect the treasury of the State. Ex parte Young was a watershed case in which this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action in the federal courts seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a statute claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The National Question in Europe in Historical Context

Id. at 448, 2 S.Ct. The same cannot be said of defendants in the pending appeal. They were all named as respondents in plaintiffs’ EEOC proceeding and as defendants in the instant action. No intervention occurred, no claims were asserted by the state defendants, and no resolution of issues other than those presented by plaintiffs’ complaints had to be resolved. It is in connection with the requirement that the two be linked that plaintiff’s retaliation claim falls short Plaintiff first claims that defendants retaliated against him by falsifying documents in order to have him removed from the facility. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) p. 11.

In their action commenced September 19, 1973, plaintiffs claimed that they had been deprived of their constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1970). The parties agree that of the five claims asserted only the first is relevant to the instant appeals. In that claim plaintiffs alleged that they had been punished, by confinement in keeplock and then by transfer to maximum security prisons, without adequate notice or hearings, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They requested declaratory and injunctive relief, expungement from their records of any mention of the laundry incident, and monetary damages from all defendants except defendant Ward who became Commissioner after the events in question. While the personal involvement of a defendant is a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983, that rule is limited to cases in which damages are sought. Bodie v. Morgenthau, 342 F.Supp.2d 193, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

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See 57 F.3d at 228, 232. After the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, the department rescinded its policy, thereby precluding any prospective relief. As a result, the plaintiffs could seek only a retrospective declaration that the department had violated federal law.

A review of the complaint and the docket reveals that six entities that were named as defendants in the complaint are not included as defendants on the docket. No. 1, at p. 1 (caption). Accordingly, the Clerk should be directed to add the following as defendants. Sheriff of Oneida County; “N.Y.S. Ally Gen.;” “N.Y.S. Court System;” U.S. Court System; “N.Y.S. Health Dept.;” and “N.Y.S. Gov. Office.” See id. Dr. Phillip DeLassus, an outside expert retained by S.C. Johnson, conducted “torture testing,” in which Slide-Loc bags were filled with water, rotated for 10 seconds, and held upside-down for an additional 20 seconds.

Defendant Morgan told plaintiff that defendant Bennidict “instructed [defendants] Morgan and . . . Hill to write [plaintiff] up for complaining [and] . . . grandstanding.” Id. at 5-6. Defendant Hill then “took [plaintiff] into the dayroom and slapped [plaintiff] on [the] right side of [his] face.” Id. at 6. The legal standard governing the review of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Section 1915 was discussed at length in the November Order and will not be restated in this Decision and Order. November Order at 2-3. On December 28, 2020, the Court received plaintiff’s amended complaint, which is accepted for filing. No. 5 (“Am. Compl.”).

Liberally construed, the amended complaint appears to assert causes of action against defendants Dorr and Sheets for failing to provide him with legal assistance concerning the alleged assault by defendant Hill on September 24, 2020. At 7-9 In particular, plaintiff alleges that, in their capacities as his lawyers related to his Article 10 petition, they are under an obligation to assist him in “object[ing] to care and treatment and to investigate any abuses and assaults by staffs.” Id. at 7. In addition, as relief, plaintiff seeks, among other things, a finding that defendant Dorr has committed legal malpractice. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Dorr and Sheets are dismissed for the following two reasons.

Id. at 4, 100 S.Ct. However, § 1983 is available to enforce a violation of a federal statute only if (1) the statute at issue creates “`enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983′” and (2) Congress has not “`foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.'” Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1366, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)). RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 57) be DENIED, defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 79) be GRANTED, and plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety.

Sometime after Ms. Fisk’s arrival at Bellevue, a hearing was conducted at the hospital to determine whether the plaintiff should remain committed. The court appointed Susan Kolcun5 to represent the plaintiff. Ms. Fisk alleges that Ms. Kolcun neither investigated Mr. Delace’s harassment nor attempted to obtain evidence to contradict his allegations.

Benefits

In addition, “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)). As the Supreme Court has noted, a defendant may only be held accountable for his actions under Section 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009) (“[P]etitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic.”). In order to prevail on a Section 1983 cause of action against an individual, a plaintiff must show “a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered.” Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).

• Defendants move to dismiss all claims asserted by Lane against defendants Carpinello and Sawyer based upon their lack of personal involvement in the allegedly offending conduct.
• Here, Plaintiff has provided a one-sentence conclusory allegation that she was “molested.” Plaintiff provides absolutely no specific allegations of fact to support this allegation.
• In that position, Turck oversaw eight OPWDD residential facilities in the Capital District.
• In his third and fourth causes of action, Boddie alleges that errors in the pre-sentence report and the negative recommendation letter affected his security classification, his participation in the “Sex Offender Program,” and his transfers between facilities.
• The initial complaint filed in the instant action was equally incomprehensible.